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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Justin Hoskins appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence
discovered during a warrantless search of his cigarette pack, after the police officer instructed
him to place that item in the vehicle that was about to be searched.
The State has conceded that the district court erred in concluding that the search was
justified under the consent exception to the warrant requirement, which was the sole justification
for the search raised and argued by the State below. The State’s new arguments, raised for the
first time on appeal, are not properly before this Court and should be rejected. The district
court’s decision denying Mr. Hoskins’ motion to suppress should be reversed.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in Mr.
Hoskins’s Appellant’s Brief.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hoskins’ motion to suppress evidence?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court’s Denial Of Mr. Hoskins Motion To Suppress Should Be Reversed
A.

The State Correctly Concedes That The District Court Erred When It Concluded The
Search Was Justified Based On Consent – Which Was The Only Exception Argued By
The State Below; The State Should Not Be Permitted To Raise A New And Different
Exception For The First Time On Appeal
The State has conceded, correctly, that the district court erroneously concluded the search

of Mr. Hoskins’ personal items was justified based on the consent of the vehicle’s owner,
Ms. Alvarez, and that the district court also erroneously concluded Mr. Hoskins lacked standing
to challenge the search of those items. (Resp. Br., pp.4-8.) The State also acknowledges that
Ms. Alvarez’s consent was the sole justification for the warrantless search argued by the State
below. (Resp. Br., p.8.)
This Reply Brief is necessary because the State is now asking this Court to consider and
affirm based on an entirely different exception to the warrant requirement: that the search of
Mr. Hoskins’ cigarette pack was justified based on the plain view doctrine. (Resp. Br., pp.8-10.)
In order to reach this result, the State asks this Court to make new factual findings necessary to
support this new theory, but which were not previously made by the district court; or else to
remand the case to see if the district court can make those findings. (Resp. Br., p.8, 9 n.2.)
Alternatively – and although it failed to argue any exception to the exclusionary rule
below – the State asks this Court for a remand so that the district court can now consider whether
some exception to the exclusionary rule might be applied in this case. (Resp. Br., pp.10-11.)
For the reasons set forth below, this Court should reject the State’s attempt to raise these
new issues. This Court should reverse the district court’s erroneous denial of Mr. Hoskins’
suppression motion, and this Court should vacate Mr. Hoskins’ judgment of conviction.
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1.

The State’s Newly-Raised “Plain View” Justification For The Search Is Not
Properly Before This Court

For the first time on appeal, the State argues that the search of Mr. Hoskins’ personal
items can be justified as constitutional under the “plain view” doctrine. (Resp. Br., pp.8-12.)
According to the State, this Court may uphold the district court’s decision based on evidence in
the record that, after being instructed by the officer to place his cigarette pack in the vehicle,
Mr. Hoskins admitted to the officer that the cigarette pack contained marijuana. (Resp. br., p.9.)
The State argues that Mr. Hoskins’ disclosure regarding the marijuana had “the practical effect
similar to placing the contents in plain view,” thereby reducing Mr. Hoskins’ reasonable
expectation of privacy in the container. (Resp. Br., p.9) (citing State v. Dreir, 139 Idaho 346,
252 (Ct. App. 2003).) From that premise, the State further argues that the officer was justified in
“retrieving” the cigarette pack and searching it for the marijuana, which in turn exposed the
methamphetamine to “plain view.” (Resp. Br., p.10.)
The State acknowledges that this justification for the search was never raised in, or
addressed by, the district court. (Resp. Br., p.8.) However, the State urges this Court to consider
this new issue. (Resp. Br., p.8.) The State’s request should be rejected. As the Idaho Supreme
Court clearly has stated:
“This Court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.” Mickelsen
Const., Inc. v. Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396, 405, 299 P.3d 203, 212 (2013) (quoting
Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790, 812, 252 P.3d 71, 93
(2011)). “Issues not raised below will not be considered by this court on appeal,
and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the
lower court.” Heckman Ranches, Inc. v. State, By & Through Dep’t of Pub.
Lands, 99 Idaho 793, 799–800, 589 P.2d 540, 546–47 (1979); Marchbanks v.
Roll, 142 Idaho 117, 119, 124 P.3d 993, 995 (2005); Frasier v. Carter, 92 Idaho
79, 82, 437 P.2d 32, 35 (1968) (“We have held generally that this court will not
review issues not presented in the trial court, and that parties will be held to the
theory on which the cause was tried.”).
State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275 (2017).
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Although it is true that this Court may, as the State says, affirm a district court’s
“ultimately correct ruling by applying a correct legal standard” (Resp. Br., p.8 (quoting Row v.
State, 135 Idaho 573, 579 (2001)).); in this instance, what the State is asking this Court to do
goes far beyond applying correct legal standards. The State here is asking this Court to both
consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal, and to also decide factual questions that were
not presented to or determined by the district court. (Resp. Br., p.8.) Recognizing the lack of
factual findings that support its new theory, the State asks this Court, if it cannot make those
findings, to remand the case so that the district court can consider making those findings.
(Resp. Br., p.9.) As such, the State’s request goes well beyond merely applying correct legal
standards and should be rejected here.
As stated in the opinions of the Supreme Court, “[i]ssues not raised below will not be
considered by this court on appeal, and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the case
was presented to the lower court.” Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho at 275; accord, State v.
Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017). This Court has “long held that appellate court review is
limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were presented below.” Garcia-Rodriguez,
at 275 (citations and brackets omitted); accord, Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 721 (“[T]he law does not
permit parties to swap horses between courts in order to get a better mount in the Supreme
Court.”).
This principal should hold especially true in this case, given that the warrantless search of
Mr. Hoskins’ personal items was presumptively illegal, and that the State bore the burden, in the
district court, to demonstrate that the search was carried out pursuant to one of the exceptions to
the warrant requirement. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); State v. Lee, 162
Idaho 642, 647 (2017). Having failed to carry that burden in the district court, the State should
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not be permitted to “swap horses” to make a second run at that burden in this Court, on an
entirely new and different theory, especially where the district court’s findings are inadequate to
support that new theory.
Additionally, a one-sided rule that permits the State to present new justifications for
searches that presumptively violate the Fourth Amendment, while precluding defendants from
raising new arguments in support of their claims of Fourth Amendment violations, seems
illustrative of the very “imbalance” the United States Supreme Court has found offensive to the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472
(1973). In Wardius, the Supreme Court held that Oregon’s rule requiring that a defendant give
notice of his alibi without providing for reciprocal discovery violates Due Process Clause. Id.
While the Court in Wardius was addressing state trial rules which provided nonreciprocal
benefits to the State, the “imbalance” condemned by the Court should be of like concern with
one-sided rules of appellate procedure.

2.

The “Plain View Doctrine” Is Inapplicable To The Facts Of This Case

Even if this Court were to permit the State to raise the issue of the plain view doctrine for
the first time on appeal, this Court should not affirm based on that theory because neither the
district court’s factual findings, nor the evidentiary record below, support that theory. In order
for the plain view doctrine to apply there must first be “a lawful intrusion or the officer must
otherwise properly be in position to view a particular area.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128,
135-36 (1990); State v. Clairborne, 120 Idaho 581, 586 (Ct. App. 2002). In this case, the State’s
argument is that Mr. Hoskins purported “admission” that there was marijuana in the cigarette
pack is equated with “placing the contents in plain view.” (Resp. Br., pp.8-9.) However,
because the district court made no finding that that police officer was acting lawfully or properly
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when he obtained that “admission,” and because it is clear from the evidentiary record that the
“admission” and a “plain view” was obtained as the product of officer conduct that was unlawful
and improper, the plain view doctrine is inapplicable in this case.
First, the district court made no findings regarding any admission by Mr. Hoskins; the
district court declined even to address Mr. Hoskins’ asserted basis for suppression, which was
that the officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights when he ordered Mr. Hoskins to place his
wallet and cigarette pack in the car the officer was about to search. (See generally R., pp.12230.) The only findings made by the district court1 regarding the officer’s interaction with
Mr. Hoskins, is as follows:
Once Trooper Knudsen obtained consent to search the car he instructed the
Defendant, Justin K. Hoskins, to exit the vehicle. As Hoskins began to exit the
car, Trooper Knudsen instructed him to leave his personal items in the backseat.
During the subsequent search of the car and questioning of the Defendant,
Trooper Knudsen found marijuana in a cigarette package left in the car by the
Defendant.
(R., p.123.)
Given that Mr. Hoskins raised the illegality of the officer’s specific conduct below, the
lack of any findings cannot be construed as a finding that the officer’s conduct was lawful.
However, no remand is necessary because is clear from the evidentiary record that the officer
acted unlawfully and improperly by ordering Mr. Hoskins to place his cigarette packet and wallet
in the vehicle that the officer was about to search. The video admitted at the suppression hearing
shows that, once the officer obtained the vehicle owner’s consent to search, he instructed
Mr. Hoskins to exit the car, and to “leave your smokes and stuff right there on the seat.”
(R., p.123; Exhibit A, 4:31:15.) When Mr. Hoskins stepped out of the vehicle with his wallet
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and cigarette pack in hand, the officer bent down, pointed into the car, and abruptly stated, “hey,
hey, hey [inaudible] your stuff right there.” (Tr., p.28, Ls.9-14; Exhibit A, 4:31:15.) Once
Mr. Hoskins obeyed that order, the officer demanded to know what was in the car, and
threatened him that, “if I find anything in that area, it’s coming back on you.” (Exhibit A.,
4:31:33 (emphasis added).)
On this record, and as argued by Mr. Hoskins below (R., p.67, Tr., 60, Ls.1-7), and in his
Appellant’s Brief, at page 9, the officer acted contrary to this Court’s holdings in State v.
Newsom, 132 Idaho 698 (1998), and in violation of Mr. Hoskins’ Fourth Amendment rights,
when the officer ordered him to place the items in the vehicle that the officer was about to
search. As was the case in Newsom, Mr. Hoskins wanted to keep, and was entitled to keep, his
personal items with him. 132 Idaho at 698. The officer’s order that he place those items in the
vehicle amounted to an unlawful seizure.

The officer’s further, coercive conduct in

misrepresenting to Mr. Hoskins that, “anything I find in that area, it’s coming back on you,” was
also unlawful and improper, since the Fourth Amendment prohibited the officer from searching
or seizing Mr. Hoskins’ cigarette packet and its contents. It is clear from this record that
Mr. Hoskins’ purported admission – and arguable exposure of the cigarette’s contents to plain
view – was the fruit of the officer’s unlawful and improper conduct. The plain view doctrine
cannot be applied in this case.2

1

The district court presumably declined to address Mr. Hoskins’ claim of unlawful conduct
because the State had not offered any justification for the officer’s order, and instead argued
exclusively – but incorrectly – that the search could be justified by the vehicle owner’s consent.
2
For the same reason, the evidence of the purported admission cannot provide a basis for the
application of the automobile exception, which allows police to search an automobile and the
containers within it when they have probable cause to believe that the automobile contains
contraband or evidence of a crime. State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898 (1991).
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3.

The Seizure And Search Of Mr. Hoskins’ Cigarette Pack Cannot Be Justified By
Officer Safety Concerns Under Terry

Notwithstanding the lack of factual findings, the State seems to argue that the officer was
justified in ordering Mr. Hoskins to place his items in the car for “officer safety concerns,”
pointing to the officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing. (Resp. Br., p.9.) The State’s
position here lacks merit and should be rejected. As this Court has held, passengers are entitled
to keep their personal items upon exiting the vehicle, and an officer’s search of those items for
weapons must be justified “under a Terry stop and frisk rationale.” State v. Wright, 174 Idaho 73,
78 (2000). The Terry rationale requires the officer to articulate specific facts to justify the
officer’s reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed and presently dangerous. See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968); State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642, 647-48 (2017).
The officer testified to no such facts in this case. To the contrary, the officer testified that
he told Mr. Hoskins to place his items in the car based the officer’s personal “preference” and a
“blanket policy” of directing people to leave their personal items in the vehicle. (Tr., p.26,
Ls.12-15.)

The officer explained that this blanket policy was based on his “training and

experience” that “people are known to carry knifes and weapons and drugs” in those containers.
(Tr., p.20, L.24 – L.21, L.8.) (Emphasis added.)
However, the officer offered no testimony of an individualized suspicion that
Mr. Hoskins was armed or dangerous (see generally Tr.), and thus, provided no lawful basis for
seizing Mr. Hoskins’ personal items, or for ordering them removed from his person, even
temporarily, under Terry. See State v. Lee, 162 Idaho 642, 647-48 (2017).
As argued in below, but never addressed by the State or by the district court, Mr. Hoskins
is entitled to the suppression of all evidence obtained as the direct or indirect result of the police
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officer’s unlawful order, which amounted to a seizure, that Mr. Hoskins place his cigarette pack
and wallet in the car. The record is clear and a remand is unwarranted.
Because the district court erroneously concluded that the warrantless search of
Mr. Hoskins’ items was justified under the consent exception, and because consent was the only
justification for the search that the State had argued in the district court, the State has failed to
carry its burden of demonstrating that the search was constitutionally justified, and the district
court’s order denying Mr. Hoskins’ suppression motion should be reversed.
B.

The State Waived The Issue Of Whether Any Exception To Exclusionary Rule Applies
To This Case By Failing To Argue That Issue Below; A Remand To Allow The State To
Argue That Issue Is Therefore Inappropriate
The State has also asked this Court for a remand to have the district court determine

whether any exception to the exclusionary rule might be applied to this case. (Resp.Br., pp.1011.) This Court should reject the State’s request because the State failed to argue the application
of any such exception below. (See generally Tr.; R., pp.98-112.) The State bore the burden of
raising and establishing the application of any exception to the exclusionary rule in the district
court. See State v. Bunting, 142 Idaho 908 (Ct. App. 2006). Had the State argued against
suppression on these grounds, below, a remand would be appropriate to address those remaining
issues. However, because the State waived the issue by failing to raise it below, there are no
remaining issues to address. Rather, what the State is asking for here is a new opportunity to
raise and litigate new issues that it never raised below. The State’s request should be denied.
See Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 721.
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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, and those set forth in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Hoskins respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the district court’s denial of his suppression motion, vacate his
judgment of conviction, and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 26th day of April, 2018.

_________/S/________________
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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